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Since the 1960's, there has been an escalating movement in Con-
gress to urge United States Presidents to retaliate against trading part-
ners who engage in "unfair" trade practices. The growing United
States trade deficit has increased the internal pressure to adopt "protec-
tionist" trade measures.' The source of most of this pressure is domestic
industries who complain that United States businesses and workers face
foreign competitors who have obtained benefits from their governments'
policies.2 It is doubtful, however, that protectionist policies will either
improve the trade deficit problem in the United States' or increase the
* J.D. 1991, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B. 1988, Duke
University.
1 The United States' trade deficit increased from $36.45 billion in 1982 to
$158.88 billion in 1987. Since 1987, though, the trade deficit has been showing signs of
declining. In 1988 the trade deficit was $126.78 billion and in 1989 the trade deficit
was $114.87 billion. This is a decrease of almost $12 billion between 1988 and 1989.
International Monetary Fund, 43 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS, Sept.
1990, at 550.
' The House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation studied United States
companies exporting products to foreign markets and found 751 specific trade barriers
to United States exports. "As a consequence, the United States has experienced a series
of record trade deficits, forcing thousands of firms to close and causing widespread
unemployment." HOUSE COMMITTEE OF ENERGY AND COMMERCE, TRADE LAW
MODERNIZATION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 468, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 5 (1986).
1 United States Trade Representative (USTR) Carla Hills commented that the
trade deficit is the product of broader economic factors than foreign nations' barriers to
trade. Since trade barriers contribute only slightly to the problem, trade liberalization
efforts will not erase the United States' trade deficit. USTR Hills Says Trade Deficit
Will Stay Until Nation Tackles Inability to Save, [6 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 19, at 575 (May 10, 1989).
[T]he trade deficit is a product of broader economic factors, including the
rate of savings, spending, and taxes. "Were there any message to be given
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overall welfare of United States citizens. 4 More important, such policies
implemented unilaterally alienate the United States from its trading
partners.
The United States is a member of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade ("GATT"),5 a multinational agreement that is a forum
for active discussion of world trade issues by its members.' One of the
central premises underlying the formation of the GATT is that trade
disputes are best solved in a multilateral forum. The United States has
become dissatisfied, however, with the internal dispute resolution pro-
cedures of the GATT and has decided that unilateral action might ob-
tain better results. In response to domestic pressure, Congress has re-
peatedly strengthened section 301, a trade law giving the Executive
Branch discretionary authority to retaliate unilaterally against foreign
nations for unfair trade practices. The Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988' went a step further and mandated that the Execu-
tive retaliate in a broad range of circumstances. The House Committee
on Ways and Means recognized section 301's potential conflict with
international agreements, but decided it was justified because "our
competitiveness is being undermined by policies and practices which the
rules of the GATT and other agreements do not adequately
discipline."'
One of the major changes in the 1988 amendment to section 301
was the addition of section 310, commonly referred to as "Super 301."'
The difference between "Super 301" and section 301 is that "[s]ection
301 deals with disputes about specific goods, whereas Super 301 is used
to the American people . . . it is a recognition that we really must save
more, which means the federal government must spend less, but also the
American people must save more ....
We could open all the markets that we have enumerated and it would not
correct our trade deficit .... [T]o tell the American people that if all you
do is open these various markets the trade deficit will go away, that is not
true."
Id. (quoting USTR Carla Hills).
" "Most trade scholars and economists still accept the idea that free trade will
increase consumer welfare even if it harms particular producers in particular coun-
tries." Gadbaw, International Property and Int'l Trade: Merger or Marriage of Con-
venience?, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223, 224 n.63 (1989).
' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948).
8 See infra notes 12-34 and accompanying text.
7 19 U.S.C. 2411-16 (Supp. v. 1987). Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of"
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. I, §§ 1301-02 , 102 Stat. 1107, 1164-76 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1988)).
S HousE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, COMPREHENSIVE TRADE POLICY
REFORM ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 581, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 6 (1986).
9 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988).
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to accuse countries of a broad range of unfair trade practices." 10 "Super
301" makes mandatory the identification of certain trade liberalization
priorities by the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") and
further removes trade disputes from the mechanisms of the GATT.,
This Comment will examine "Super 301" and the way in which
its application contributes to increasing bilateralism in world trade.
The first section will set out the purposes and relevant provisions of the
GATT. The second section will discuss the origins of the section 301
remedy, the procedures for identifying "unfair" foreign trade practices,
and retaliation under the new "Super 301." It will also examine three
countries under "Super 301" investigation in 1989: Brazil, India, and
Japan. The third section will focus on the inconsistencies between sec-
tion 301's unilateral approach and the multilateral GATT. Finally,
this Comment will consider the harmful affects of "Super 301" on both
multilateral trade and U.S. competitiveness. This Comment will con-
clude that the "Super 301" process is an illegal resort to unilateral
action when GATT rules are involved in the trade disputes. Further,
even when the substantive provisions of GATT are not at issue, "Super
301" is a particularly dangerous policy in an increasingly interdepen-
dent world trade arena.
2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE
2.1. Historical Origins
The GATT is a set of rules governing international trade. 2 It was
passed in the wake of World War II and was designed to eliminate
many of the problems fostered by existing bilateral trade agreements."3
Most of the text of the GATT originated in the negotiations for the
"0 Nothing to Lose but Its Chains: The ITO That Never Was, ECONOMIST, Sept.
22, 1990, at 7 [hereinafter Nothing to Lose].
,1 Jagdish Dhagwat, an economics professor at Columbia University, says that "a
worrisome development in U.S. policy is the 'trend to unilateralism' as evidenced by the
Super 301 designations .... [T]his 'amounts to taking the law into our hands' and
should be taken before the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade where the Super
301 process would be declared illegal." United States Should Resist Pressures For
Managed Trade Policy, Analysts Say, [6 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 49, at 1273 (Oct. 4, 1989).
1 See generally, J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE LAW AND THE LAW OF THE
GATT, [hereinafter LAW OF THE GATT].
"' For example, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, see 46 Stat. 590 (1930), set off a
world trade war, as the United States' trading partners responded to high duties by
raising barriers to trade against the United States and eventually against each other.
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creation of the International Trade Organization (ITO). The charter
creating the ITO was never ratified by all member nations. Instead an
interim arrangement, the GATT, was settled on by the participating
governments, which adapted ITO's mandate in international trade rela-
tions. 4 During the first thirty years of GATT's existence, governments
reduced the average tariff on manufactured goods from 40 percent in
1947 to less than 10 percent by the mid-1970's. Today the average
current tariff is about 5 percent." Tariff liberalization propelled rapid
growth in world trade. 6 The GATT has been modified several times
since its inception.'" At the Tokyo Round negotiations 8 a number of
multilateral agreeements covering nontariff restrictions such as procure-
ment, subsidies and technical barriers were adopted. The most recent
negotiations, the Uruguay Round, began in September 1986."' Negoti-
ators are seeking to reduce remaining tariffs by 30 percent, to
strengthen existing trade rules and to extend the GATT to trade in
services, strengthen intellectual property rights protection, and expand
international foreign investment rules.2" It is important to note that the
14 The negotiating history of ITO is relied on as evidence of the negotiators' intent
for the purpose of interpreting the GATT. See A. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 11-21 (2d ed. 1983).
15 Nothing to Lose, supra note 10, at 7.
16 "Between 1950 and 1975 the volume of trade expanded by as much as 500%,
against an increase in global output of 220%." Id.
17 The current version of the GATT is found in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT OF
TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969)
[hereinafter GATT].
18 Article XXVIII of the GATT provides that the conditions of trade should be
discussed and agreed upon within a multilateral framework through periodic negotia-
tions. See AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 7 (1979).
" The Uruguay Round was scheduled to end in December 1990. However, as of
publication the Uruguay Round negotiations had yet to reach successful conclusion.
Negotiations are stalled in a number of areas including: agriculture reform, trade-re-
lated intellectual property issues, and disputes between the United States and the Euro-
pean Community on alleged subsidies for the European Airbus Industrie consortium.
See GATT Talks on Intellectual Property, Investment Issues Hit Snag, Sources Say,
[Daily Report for Executives) Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 56 (Mar. 22, 1991)
(NEXIS); EC Calls for Overhaul of GATT Code on Civil Aviation to Address Airbus
Dispute [Daily Report for Executives] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 56 (Mar. 22, 1991)
(NEXIS); U.S. Hopes to Complete GATT Talks this Year, Seeks New 'Target' for
Ending Negotiations [Daily Report for Executives] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 56
(Mar. 22, 1991) (NEXIS); Remarks of Deputy Trade Representative Jules Katz to the
American Bar Association, J.W. Marriott Hotel, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 21, 1991)
(NEXIS); Dunkel Calls for Political Courage, Not Rhetoric, in Uruguay Round
[General Developments: GATT] Int'l Trade. Rep. (BNA) No. 34 (Aug. 21, 1991)
(NEXIS).
20 See GATT's Dunkel Criticizes U.S. Section 301, Urges Strong Commitment to
Uruguay Round, [7 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 766 (May
30, 1990). The biggest problem in the Uruguay Round has been the European Com-
munity's and United States' inability to reach agreement on agriculture reform. See
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GATT is both a set of rules governing international trade and an insti-
tution administering those rules and overseeing multilateral trade
negotiations.
2.2. Most-Favored-Nation Obligation under the GATT
One of the most important principles of the GATT is the Most-
Favored-Nation ("MFN") obligation. Generally, unless a nation has
made a treaty or agreement, there is no obligation under customary
international law to extend non-discriminatory treatment to other na-
tions.21 The MFN provision in article I of the GATT is effectively a
rule of non-discrimination among all member countries.2 2 Each con-
tracting party to the GATT is obligated to treat all other contracting
parties and their goods no less favorably than any other nation. Thus,
unilateral retaliation such as that authorized, and in some cases man-
dated, by section 301 violates the GATT by destroying MFN.
2 3
2.3. Dispute Resolution Procedures of the GATT
The GATT provides a method in articles XXII and XXIII for
the resolution of diputes between the contracting parties. 4 The goal of
article XXII is to provide a framework for consultations among the
parties, stressing general obligations to consult on any matter relating
to GATT.25 Article XXIII plays an important role in obtaining com-
Dancingfrom Bad to Worse, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 1990, at 25.
2 The League of Nations' Committees recognized that the MFN obligation
would be applied only by agreement. See Recommendations of the Economic Committee
Relating to Tariff Policy and the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause; League of Nations
Doc. E.805 II Economic and Financial, II.B.1. at 6 (1933). See also J. JACKSON, LE-
GAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 527 (1977) [hereinafter
LEGAL PROBLEMS].
22 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 801 comment a [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
22 See generally Comment, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its Utility
Against Alleged Unfair Trade Practices by the Japanese Government, 81 Nw. U.L.
REV. 492 (1987) [hereinafter Section 301 Against Japanese Gov't].
4 See generally, LAW OF THE GATT, supra note 12, at 171-87. See also GATT,
supra note 17, at arts. XXII-XXIII. In addition, The Tokyo Round produced a re-
form package in response to concern that the GATT's dispute settlement mechanisms
were functioning inadequately. GATT, 26th Supp. B1SD 210-18 (1980). See gener-
ally, Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round. An Unfinished Busi-
ness, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980).
The United States became a party in 1979 to an "Agreement on Interpretation
and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the (GATT)." See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 22, § 806 n.1.
215 GATT, supra note 17, at article XXII. Consultation is authorized in a two-
step process: first, individual consultations between contracting parties; second, referral
to the contracting parties jointly. See also LAW OF THE GATT, supra note 12, at 175.
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pliance with GATT obligations.
Under article XXIII the complaining party is first required to
"make written representations or proposals to the other contracting
party . . . concerned."28 If no satisfactory accord is reached, the Con-
tracting Parties2 then have a duty to promptly investigate and make
appropriate recommendations or give a ruling on the matter to the
Contracting Parties.28 If a party to a dispute fails to comply with a
decision, the Contracting Parties have the power, but not the duty, to
authorize a member nation to suspend the application of concessions or
other obligations.2 9 Enforcement is limited to purely compensatory
retaliation."0
A contracting party is entitled to pursue article XXIII procedures
whenever it considers that either a "benefit accruing to it ... is being
nullified or impaired" 1 or "the attainment of any objective of the
Agreement is being impeded" because of:
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its
obligations under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any mea-
sure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this
Agreement, or.
(c) the existence of any other situation .... 32
26 GATT, supra note 17, at article XXlII(1).
27 The members of the GATT, the contracting parties, when acting together, be-
come the Contracting Parties. See GATT, supra note 17, at art. XXV(1).
2 GATT, supra note 17, at art. XXIII(2).
2 See GATT, supra note 17, at art. XXIII(2). There has only been one com-
plaint to the Contracting Parties that resulted in suspension of concessions under article
XXIII. GATT, 1st Supp. BISD 32 (1953), followed by a series of decisions ending at
GATT, 7th Supp. BISD 23 (1959); see list, in index of GATT, 14th Supp. BISD 213
(1966) (Netherlands Complaint against the United States for dairy import restrictions).
SO The use of sanctions as a retaliatory measure is prohibited under the GATT.
The most drastic measure authorized by article XXIII is the suspension of concessions
or obligations under the Agreement. Referring to the negotiating history of the ITO as
authoritative evidence of negotiators' intent under the GATT, sanctions are not a per-
missible retaliatory measure. "The idea of sanctions was considered at length in a
drafting subcommittee, but ultimately the draftsmen concluded that the governments
would not accept an international organization with such powers. The remedy for both
legal violations and nonviolation nullification and impairment would have to be com-
pensatory." See Hudec, Retaliation Against Unreasonable Foreign Trade Practices:
The New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REv.,
461, 467 n.15 (1975) [hereinafter GATT Nullification and Impairment].
" See generally id. at 485-505. The concept of "nullification and impairment" is
not well defined. It does "seem to imply that there must be some sort of injury to a
contracting party before it has the right to invoke Article XXIII .... " LAw OF THE
GATT, supra note 12, at 181-83.
" The full text of article XXIII reads:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it
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Article XXIII thus permits any contracting party to claim "nullifica-
tion or impairment" of GATT rights as a result of either a violation of
GATT rules or any other measure that has the effect of denying the
contracting party rights for which it bargained, even in the absence of a
direct GATT breach. In fact, general economic circumstances in the
world could present an occasion for an article XXIII application for
proceedings by a contracting party.33
The all-encompassing language of article XXIII permits a con-
tracting party to seek resolution of any trade dispute under the proceed-
ings of the GATT. However, the GATT arguably has exclusive juris-
diction only over disputes that involve substantive provisions of the
GATT. "[T]he existence of clauses outlining methods of dispute settle-
ment or enforcement in the same treaty containing the substantive obli-
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired
or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded
as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obliga-
tions under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of the Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of
the matter, make written representations of proposals to the other con-
tracting party or parties to which it considers to be concerned. Any con-
tracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the
representations or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties
concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type de-
scribed in paragraph 1 (c) of the Article, the matter may be referred to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appro-
priate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to
be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter,-as appropriate. The CON-
TRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appro-
priate inter-governmental organization in cases where they consider such
consultation necessary. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that
the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may au-
thorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any
other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations
under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circum-
stances. If the application to any contracting party of any concession or
other obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be
free, not later than sixty days after such action is taken, to give written
notice to the Executive Secretary to the CONTRACTING PARTIES of
its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal from
this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth
day following the day on which such notice is received by him.
GATT, supra note 17, at art. XXIII.
33 See LAW OF THE GATT, supra note 12, at 180.
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gations can be argued to exclude the right to rely upon other methods..
.-;34 such a situation exists under the GATT. Articles XXII and XX-
III are central to settling disputes between GATT members regarding
the substantive provisions of that treaty. Therefore, in cases of trade
disputes falling within the scope of the GATT, the United States' re-
sort to its own laws rather than international law under the GATT
may be regarded as a violation of United States obligations under the
GATT.
In addition, the broad language of article XXIII allows a con-
tracting party to request proceedings in cases where the trade dispute
does not involve allegations of a GATT breach. Under such circum-
stances, however, article XXIII is not an exclusive remedy.
3. SECTION 301 LEGISLATION: ITS EVOLUTION AND
INCONSISTENCY WITH THE GATT
3. 1. The Purpose of Section 301
The purpose of section 301 is the elimination or reduction of ac-
tion by foreign governments that are in violation of GATT provisions
and that create and maintain barriers to the import of United States
products. 5 It is the sole trade remedy aimed principally at faciliating
United States export of goods and services to foreign markets. 6 The
United States has been a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade since 1947, and as such has certain rights of access to for-
eign markets. Congress felt that other countries were not upholding
their obligations under the GATT, and was dissatisfied with the results
of the GATT's internal mechanisms for dispute resolution."' By grant-
34 Id. at 163-64.
" See generally Comment, Opening up Trade Barriers with Section 301 - A
Critical Assessment, 5 Wis. INT'L L.J. 176 (1986) [hereinafter Opening Up Trade
Barriers].
"B Most other U.S. trade remedies are oriented toward imports. See, e.g., an-
tidumping laws, 19 U.S.C. § 1673, which imposes duties on foreign imports that are
sold at less than market value. The U.S. International Trade Commission must find
that a United States industry is materially damaged to impose duties. When the Com-
merce Department finds there is dumping, an antidumping order will be issued and a
duty imposed equal to the difference between the fair market value and the value of the
imported product. These laws are consistent with article VI of the GATT.
Countervailing duty laws, 19 U.S.C. § 303, are imposed when the Commerce De-
partment finds that imports into the United States are subsidized unfairly by their
government and the International Trade Comission finds material injury to United
States industry. The procedures involved comply with International Subsidies Code and
the right to take unilateral action against subsidies is recognized under international
law. See also Section 301 Against Japanese Gov't, supra note 23, at 511-12.
"7 In December, 1985 the United States International Trade Commission reported
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ing the President retaliatory authority outside of the GATT, section
301 was designed to compel the United States' trading partners to pro-
vide reciprocal trading opportunities and to deter the erection of, and to
eliminate already existing, non-tariff barriers8 to United States
exports.
3.2. Section 301: Its Origins and Evolution
The retaliatory action mandated by section 301 against "unfair"
foreign trade practices has been progressively strengthened by Con-
gress.39 Through successive amendments "the authority has been ex-
panded to cover all measures covered by trade agreements and all forms
of unfair practices by foreign governments which burden or restrict
to the Senate Finance Committee on an investigation of the GATT dispute settlement
mechanisms and their relationship to United States trade law. Three main problems
with the GATT dispute resolution process have been alleged: (1) the time required to
complete a case is too long, (2) there are too many opportunities for the "defendant"
country to obstruct the process, and (3) implementation of the GATT decision is uncer-
tain. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PuB. No. 1793, INVESTIGATION No. 332-212, RE-
VIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE GATT
AND THE ToKYo ROUND AGREEMENTS (1985).
s Non-tariff barriers were not contemplated by the original drafters of the
GATT. See GATT Nullification and Impairment, supra note 30, at 510-14. There
are a variety of non-tariff barriers erected by importing nations. In general, they are
"government or private business practices that distort trade flows by either directly or
indirectly providing domestic production with an advantage over foreign goods." SUB-
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., UNFAIR FOREIGN TRADE PRAC-
TICES 17 (Comm. Print 1986).
Trade barriers receiving the largest number of complaints from private sector re-
spondents to a subcommittee request for information regarding barriers to U.S. trade
included the following:
(1) Import Licensing Practices: developing country officials can control the
flow of imports by using their discretionary power to issue import permits.
(2) Discriminatory Product Standards: product standards whose primary
purpose is to protect the public health, safety or welfare are imposed
discriminatorily.
(3) Embargoes or Bans on Imports: used as an instrument of trade control.
(4) Government Subsidies: low cost loans, concessionary export financing,
cash payments, tax breaks, etc.
(5) Offset and Barter Requirements: foreign governments may require ex-
porters to sell specified quantities of the purchaser's products or purchase
specified quantities of a purchaser's products as a condition of sale.
(6) Local Content Requirements: specified amounts of local materials, la-
bor, or products are required to be purchased or employed with the sale of
a U.S. exported product.
(7) Quotas: specifications on the maximum of imports permitted in a time
period.
Id. at 19-20.
39 For a discussion of the retaliatory authority of the Executive Branch, see gener-
ally LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 21.
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U.S. commerce, including those affecting services trade and investment
flows, as well as goods." 40 The trend is for Congress to increase the
number of mandatory areas of investigation and retaliation with which
the Executive Branch must comply.
Section 301 has its origins in section 252(c) of the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962.41 Under section 252(c) the President had authority to
"suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of benefits of trade
"142agreement concessions ... , in response to unjustifiable foreign import
restrictions or unreasonable import restrictions that sustantially burden
United States commerce. Owing to the view that this provision was
confining, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 repealed section 252(c)
and modified the President's power.43 Under the 1974 version of sec-
tion 301 the President was authorized not merely to suspend conces-
sions, but to institute retaliatory action44 when he determined that a
foreign country maintained a trade policy that was "unjustifiable, un-
reasonable, or discriminatory and burden[ed] or restrict[ed] United
States commerce." '45 In addition, the scope of section 301 was expanded
to cover additional discriminatory practices such as export subsidies and
embargoes and restrictions on services related to trade.46
Section 301 was amended in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979."'
The changes further expanded Presidential authority to "respond to
any act, policy, or practice .. . inconsistent with the provisions of...
any trade agreement. '48 Again, in 1984 section 301 was amended
through the Trade and Tariff Act.4 9 Pressure from the service and in-
40 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, COMPREHENSIVE TRADE POLICY
REFORM AcT OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 581, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 25 (1986).
41 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252, 76 Stat. 872, 879-
80, repealed by Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 301-02, 88 Stat. 1978,
2041-43 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. V 1987)). Section 252(c)
provided that the President could suspend the benefits of trade agreements with nations
whose import restrictions "directly or indirectly substantially burden the United States
commerce." Id.
42 Id.
4' Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43 (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-16 (Supp. V 1987)).
4" The 1974 Act allowed the President to "impose duties and import restrictions
without regard to any statutory limits as well as fees and restrictions on services."
GATT Nullification and Impairment, supra note 30, at 515 n.140. The difference
between suspension of concessions and retaliation is an important distinction under the
GATT. It is this shift from authority to suspend concessions to authority to retaliate
that conflicts with article XXIII(2) of the GATT. See also supra note 30.
45 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
48 See GATT Nullification and Impairment, supra note 30, at 515.
4' Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat. 144, 296
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. V 1987)).
48 Id.
4' Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 301-07, 98 Stat. 2948,
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vestment industries brought these sectors under the protection of section
301.80
3.3. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 19885'
Continuing dissatisfaction with enforcement of the GATT and po-
litical pressure from industrialists within the United States prompted
further revision of section 301 in the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988. The changes were designed to strengthen what Con-
gress believed to be the inadequate trade law for dealing with foreign
industries' targeting policies. 52 Congress justified these changes "be-
cause current national policy is ill-equipped to bring about changes in
our trade relations," and because it was dissatisfied with the Adminis-
tration's "slavish devotion to rules of the GATT which few of our trad-
ing partners take seriously.""3 The amended version of section 301 cre-
ates circumstances in which retaliation is mandated54 and imposes strict
time limits for consultations and determinations regardless of GATT
proceedings. 55 It also divests the President of investigatory and retalia-
tory power and transfers it to the United States Trade Representa-
tive. 8 Also, the Trade Act created "Super 301," the newest addition to
the United States arsenal. The remainder of this Comment will focus
on "Super 301" and the issues it raises with regard to the GATT.
3000-13 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. V 1987)) (amended
1988).
50 See Opening Up Trade Barriers, supra note 35, at 184-190 for a summary of
changes made to section 301 by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
51 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, title I,
§§ 1301-02, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164-76 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20
(1988)).
52 See generally HousE COMMITTEE OF ENERGY AND COMMERCE, TRADE LAW
MODERNIZATION AcT, H.R. REP. 468, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1986).
53 Id. at 5.
"Under current law, when there is an affirmative determination that:
(A) the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are being
denied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country -
(i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise
denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement, or
(ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce;
the Trade Representative shall take action ....
19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1988).
5s Consultations with a foreign country are limited to a maximum of 150 days,
after which the USTR has the earlier of 18 months from the initiation of or 30 days
from the conclusion of a dispute resolution decision to negotiate a settlement. See 19
U.S.C. §§ 2413-14 (1988).
"5 Prior to the 1988 amendment, section 301 authority resided with the President.
This authority was transferred from the President to the USTR in the 1988 amend-
ment. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1988) (amending 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-16 (Supp. V 1987).
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3.4. The "Super 301" Process: Mandatory Self-Initiation
Title III of the 1988 Trade Bill added a new subsection, section
310." This section is the provision commonly referred to as "Super
301." "Super 301" imposes new self-initiation requirements on the
United States Trade Representative 58 and eliminates much of the dis-
cretionary element of the earlier versions of section 301. Under the ear-
lier versions of section 301 there were two methods by which investiga-
tions of foreign governments could be initiated: by private petition
5
1
and by self-initiation.60 These two methods of initiation still exist;
"Super 301" is an additional method of initiation.6
"Super 301" requires the United States Trade Representative to
report to Congress annually on United States trade liberalization pri-
orities.62 The report shall list priority foreign countries,6 priority prac-
5 Section 310 of Title III is codified as 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988).
88 Clayton Yeutter, the USTR at the time, criticized proposals, like the one
adopted, mandating retaliation and self-initiation and transferring administrative au-
thority from the President to the USTR because they would ultimately harm United
States interests:
To box us in by requiring self-initiation or retaliation would be a costly
mistake, to the detriment of U.S. industry. And to deflate the importance
of 301 by demoting the decisionmaker from the President to the trade rep-
resentative would reduce the likelihood of favorable results from its use.
Yeutter Asserts Proposed Changes in Section 301 Are Unnecessary, Would Harm U.S.
Interest, [3 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 940 (July 23, 1986).
89 The GATT itself has no mechanism whereby individual complaints can access
the dispute procedures. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a), however, provides private parties with
indirect access by permitting individuals to file a request with the USTR to take action
under section 301. Such a request must be reviewed by the USTR and a decision
whether to initiate an investigation must be made within 45 days. The United States
Government then has discretion whether to direct these complaints to the GATT Con-
tracting Parties. "Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 creates a unique relationship
between United States law and the GATT dispute settlement process by permitting
private parties to present a petition concerning trade problems to the United States
Government." U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PuB. No. 1793, INVESTIGATION No. 332-
212, REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADE DIsPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE
GATT AND THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS (1985).
60 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b). This self-initiation power was first exercised in Septem-
ber 1985 by President Reagan. See, e.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 37,608 (1985) (Brazil's In-
formatics Investigation); 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (1985) (Japan Tobacco Products); 50
Fed. Reg. 37,609 (1985) (Korean Insurance); 50 Fed. Reg. 45,883 (1985) (Korean
Intellectual Property Rights). The 1988 amendment to section 301 authorizes the
USTR, instead of the President, to initiate investigations on her own determination.
The USTR has a specific directive to initiate an investigation of countries identi-
fied under 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(2) as denying adequate protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights. This is known as "special 301." For a general discussion of intellectual
property protection in the international marketplace, see Trade Regulated Aspects of
Intellectual Property, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223 (1989).
01 Three "Super 301" investigations were initiated on June 21, 1989. The three
priority countries were Japan, India, and Brazil. See infra notes 69-71.
"' The USTR is mandated under "Super 301" to submit an annual report to
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tices 64 with respect to each of these countries, and the projected in-
creases in exports in the absence of these practices.15 In identifying a
priority country, the number and pervasiveness of market barriers and
unfair trade practices impeding United States exports, as well as the
potential for improvement, should be taken into account. 6 The USTR
should list those priority practices which would most significantly in-
crease exports if eliminated.67 The USTR must then initiate investiga-
tions of all priority practices for each of the priority countries listed in
the report.68
3.5. Priority Countries under "Super 301"
In 1989 the USTR identified three countries which would be the
subject of the "Super 301" process: Japan,69 Brazil,"' and India.7
Congress identifying priority countries which are to be the subject of the "Super 301"
process. 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(1)(D) (1988). See Report of Trade Liberalization Priori-
ties Pursuant to Section 310 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 55 Fed. Reg.
18,693 (1990) for the 1990 report submitted by the USTR identifying "priority prac-
tices" under "Super 301." See also 54 Fed. Reg. 24,438 (1989) for the report submitted
in 1989.
63 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(1)(B) (1988).
- 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(1)(A) (1988).
*5 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(1)(C) (1988).
66 In identifying priority countries under 19 U.S.C. §§ 2420(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2)
the USTR is directed to 29 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1):
[T]he United States Trade Representative ... shall-
(A) identify and analyze acts, policies, or practices of each foreign country
which constitute significant barriers to, or distortions of-
(i) United States exports of goods or services . . ., and
(ii) foreign direct investment by United States persons, especially if
such investment has implications for trade in goods or services.
19 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1) (1988).
67 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(1)(A) (1988). Priority practices include major trade barri-
ers and trade distorting practices.
6 19 U.S.C. § 2420(b) (1988).
69 Japan was named a priority country because of exclusionary government pro-
curement policies that afford protection to domestic products and exclude foreign sup-
pliers, and technical barriers to trade that create unnecessary obstacles to international
trade of forest products. Subsequent investigations were initiated with respect to a ban
on government procurement of foreign satellites, 54 Fed. Reg. 26,136 (1989), and a
second with respect to exclusionary government procurement of supercomputers. 54
Fed. Reg. 26,137 (1989).
7 Under section 310, certain quantitative import restrictions maintained by the
Government of Brazil were identified as "priority practices." See 54 Fed. Reg. 24,438
(1989). Brazil maintains an import prohibition list which covers approximately 1,000
items, barring U.S. exports of agricultural items and manufactured goods, including
meat, dairy products, plastics, chemicals, textiles, leather products, electronic items, mo-
tor vehicles, and furniture. Brazil also uses its licensing regime to implement company-
specific and sectoral import quotas, which impede many important U.S. export items,
including office machine parts, internal combustion engine parts, and electrical machin-
ery. See 54 Fed. Reg. 26,135 (1989).
71 Investigations were initiated regarding India's trade related investment mea-
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3.5.1. Japan
"Super 301" in many respects was designed specifically as a tool
to use against the Japanese trade surplus with the United States.
7 2
There is widespread resentment toward Japan's economic strength and
perceived unfair trade practices. However, Japan's trade surplus has
fallen from 4.4 percent of gross domestic product in 1986 to only 2.4
percent of gross domestic product in the first half of 1989. In addition,
its global surplus fell 90 percent in January 1990, and its imports of
manufactured goods reached almost 50 percent of total imports into Ja-
pan in 1988.
7 3
In 1990, the United States and Japanese agreements in satellites,
super-computers and wood products, 4 and provisions by Japan to dis-
mantle its structural barriers convinced USTR Hills to leave Japan off
the "Super 301" list.7 5 In response, more than 70 House members
signed a petition calling for Hills to change her opinion and urged that
Japan be cited again under "Super 301" as an unfair trading nation.
7 6
Legislation, known as the Levin-Specter bill, was introduced to force
the designation of Japan as an unfair trading nation that discriminates
against United States exports. 77 The purpose of the Levin-Specter bill
sures requiring foreign investors to export a portion of what they produce, or to use
locally-produced inputs. 54 Fed. Reg. 26,136 (1989). In addition, barriers to trade in
services, for example, completely closing the market to foreign insurance companies, led
the USTR to identify India as a priority country. 54 Fed. Reg. 26,135 (1989).
72 See Holland, Bashing, Bullying, Blaming Japan, U.S. Deals with a Deficit,
L.A. Times (May 7, 1989); § 5, at 1, col. 1.
71 TRADE WARRIORS: THE GUIDE TO THE POLITICS OF TRADE AND FOREIGN
INVEsTMENT 4 (R.J. Whalen & C. Whalen eds. 1990) [hereinafter TRADE
WARRIORS].
7" These are the three priority practices cited in 1989 under "Super 301." See
supra note 69.
71 See 55 Fed. Reg. 18,693, 18,695 (1990). "[W]e have reached satisfactory solu-
tions on all three of the Japanese practices. . . ." Id. at 18,695. See also Controversial
Super .301 Clause Extolled and Villified, Reuter Bus. Rep. (Apr. 27, 1990).
7" Many of these Congressmen represent constituencies in the automobile industry
and other businesses especially hard hit by Japanese imports. Frank, House Members
Call on U.S. to Cite Japan for Unfair Trade, Reuter Bus. Rep. (Apr. 27, 1990).
7 Congressional proponents of the auto and auto parts industries introduced legis-
lation aimed at forcing the Administration to retaliate against Japan if it fails to open
its auto parts market further. See S. 2573, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC.
S5659-60 (daily ed. May 3, 1990) (Fair Trade in Auto Parts Act); 133 CONG. REc.
E1407-08 (daily ed. May 8, 1990) (reproduction of bill). See also Barry, Senate Bill
Would Cite Japan for Unfair Trading, Reuter Bus. Rep. (Apr. 27, 1990); USTR Hills
Rejects Calls in Congress for US to 'Manage' Trade with Japan, [7 Current Reports]
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 681 (May 16, 1990); U.S., Japan to Hold High-
Level Talks Aimed at Liberalizing Japan's Auto Part Market, [7 Current Reports]
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 801 (June 6, 1990).
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was to take away the administration's discretion under "Super 301"
and to initiate an investigation of Japan in spite of the USTR's deci-
sion to the contrary. The bill would also extend the "Super 301" provi-
sion past 1990.78
The Administration considers the Uruguay Round its first prior-
ity,79 while Congress sees implementing the 1988 Trade Act as it re-
lates to Japan as coming first. As evidenced by the legislation and con-
tingent debates, this is a major source of friction between the Executive
and Legislative Branches." "If the Administration bows to the political
expediency and follows the polls showing broad support for Japan-
bashing protectionism, Congress will fill the policy vacuum with legis-
lation inviting a replay of 1930's-type trade wars." 1 The existence of
legislation such as "Super 301" means that special interests and indus-
tries are going to push for its use in order to protect their own interests.
3.5.2. Brazil
The "Super 301" investigation of Brazil was based on its quanti-
tative import restrictions, including import bans, quotas, and restrictive
licensing regimes that inhibit imports of manufactured and agricultural
products.82 The United States, as Brazil's largest trading partner, has
frequently complained about Brazil's trade policies and their effects on
the growing deficit the United States has in trade with Brazil.8 Brazil
defended its restrictions based on article XVIII of the GATT which
allows import controls for a fundamental balance-of-payments dise-
quilibrium: ' "It is not by chance that Brazil is completely up to date
on its debt-interest payments; Brazil is one of the few Latin American
countries with a healthy trade surplus."8 5
The United States alleged that Brazil's import restrictions did not
78 See 133 CONG. REC. E1407-08 (daily ed. May 8, 1990) (reproduction of bill).
11 See 55 Fed. Reg. 18,693 (1990).
80 See TRADE WARRIORS, supra note 73, at 6.
si Id. at 3.
82 See supra note 70.
a The trade balance with Brazil was in surplus of $628 million in 1980. In 1987
this balance showed a deficit of $3,826 million. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FT 990,
HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S. EXPORT AND IMPORT TRADE (Chart No. 1372 on U.S. Ex-
ports, Imports, and Merchandise Trade Balance, by Continent, Area, and Country:
1980 to 1987).
" See generally LAw OF THE GATT, supra note 12, at 625-72.
85 Brooke, Brazil Cites Large Debt in Its Defense on Trade, N.Y. Times (May
27, 1989), § 1, at 31, col. 4 (quoting a Brazilian Government Official who works on
debt negotiations). "Since 1982 there has been a dramatic change in the Brazilian bal-
ance of payments, wrought largely by the debt crisis with new loans from foreign com-
merical banks drying up. Brazil has found itself unable to meet scheduled debt repay-
ments and has resorted to restructuring its debt while striving to achieve substantial
trade surpluses." ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, BRAZIL COUNTRY PROFILE 44.
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qualify for the GATT exception for fundamental balance-of-payments
disequillibrium under article XVIII.86 Under GATT article XVIII
section B, 7 developing countries 8 with unstable currencies or massive
external debts are eligible for a waiver that permits some import quota
programs and other schemes aimed at protecting certain industries.
This is an issue that clearly falls within the rules of the GATT.89
Advocates of the "Super 301" investigation in the United States
argued that the restrictive licensing practices of Brazil are inconsistent
with GATT article X190 and are not justified under either the article
XII or article XVII exceptions for balance-of-payments problems."'
" Article XVIII was specifically designed for developing countries. Developing
countries are given the right to deviate from GATT provisions by using protective mea-
sures. See LAW oF THE GATT, supra note 12, at 649-56.
GATT article XVIII(1) states:
The contracting parties recognize that the attainment of the objectives
of this Agreement will be facilitated by the progressive development of
their economies, particularly of those contracting parties the economies of
which can only support low standards of living and are in the early stages
of development.
GATT, supra note 17, at art. XVIII(1).
'7 "In order to safeguard its external financial position and to ensure a level of
reserves adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development, a
contracting party ... may,.. . control the general level of its imports by restricting the
quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported." See generally LAW OF
THE GATT, supra note 12, at 687-93.
88 Only "less-developed countries" or "developing countries" are eligible for arti-
cle XVIII balance-of-payments exceptions. For a general definition of a "less-developed
country," see LAW OF THE GATT, supra note 12, at 650-52.
" The United States and the EC joined forces in a complaint against Brazil,
claiming that the list of products for which import licenses are required because of
balance-of-payments problems in that country is growing at an unacceptable rate. Bra-
zil said this question should be discussed in GATT's balance-of-payments committee,
and the United States and the EC did not press the point. See EC Claims U.S. Is
Violating GATT Commitment Not To Take New Restrictive Trade Measures, [4 Cur-
rent Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 824 (June 24, 1987).
11 Article XI(1) prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports implemented
through the use of import licenses.
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on
the importation of any product of the territory of any contracting party or
on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the terri-
tory of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 17, at art. XI(1).
Article XI(2) provides for exceptions for imports of agricultural products, but only
where the importing nation is restricting the quantities of a like domestic product or
substitute domestic product. See LAW OF THE GATT, supra note 12, at 733-77 for a
discussion of agriculture waivers under the GATT.
9' Articles XII and XVIII are general exceptions to the broad prohibition on re-
strictions and authorize quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons.
The United States' position was that Brazil's licensing policies were indefensible
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The United States argues that because Brazil's trade surplus had
grown over the past year, Brazil has not met the conditions necessary to
avail itself of these exceptions. Their licensing policies, therefore, are
alleged to be indefensible. On the other hand, while it is true that Bra-
zil's trade surplus has grown, Brazil's overall balance-of-payments
problem still persists.
The issue of the validity of Brazil's import restrictions involves the
interpretation of a GATT provision and its applicability to the specific
circumstances existing in Brazil. The United States' unilateral action
against Brazil under "Super 301" is particularly troublesome since
Brazil's justification for the import restrictions fell clearly within the
scope of the GATT. Whether or not Brazil's quantitative import re-
strictions were valid under the balance-of-payments exceptions, and
thus violative of the GATT, is a matter of debate. However, the
GATT provides a means to resolve disagreements between its members
that the United States has an obligation to use.
Like Japan, Brazil was not cited under "Super 301" in 199092
and the United States took no retaliatory action. Nevertheless, the
threat of retaliation can do as much damage to free trade as actual
retaliation.9 For United States importers of Brazilian products, the
threat of retaliation is, in many ways, the commercial equivalent of
actual retaliation because of the cost of uncertainty. To the degree that
alternative suppliers are available, contracts dry up because of the risk
that future prices will be signficantly higher if tariffs are imposed.94
Thus, Brazilian exports suffer under United States trade policies that
threaten retaliation, regardless of whether or not actual retaliation
occurs.
95
under these exceptions. Article XII(3)(c) and article XVIII(10) require that quantita-
tive restrictions be applied "to avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial or eco-
nomic interest of any other contracting party." GATT, supra note 17, at arts.
XI(3)(c)(i), XVII(10).
In addition, articles XII(2)(b) and XVIII(11) require that Brazil "progressively
relax any restrictions applied . . . as conditions improve." GATT, supra note 17, at
arts. XII(2)(b), XIII(11).
92 See 55 Fed. Reg. 18,693, 18,695 (1990).
, Some argue that the United States would not actually violate the GATT until
unilateral sanctions were imposed. See Recent Developments, HARV. INT'L L.J. 359,
365 (1990).
" Telephone interview with Royal Daniel, III, of Bishop, Cook, Purcell & Reyn-
olds (attorneys for Coordinating Group for Brazilian Private Sector Action) (jan. 4,
1990).
* Flexa de Lima, Brazil's chief negotiator, stated that an appeal may be made to
the GATT for compensation for the harmful effects the threat of retaliation may cause
to Brazilian exports. Brazil Says U.S. Action Under Super 301 Will Have "Negative
Effect" on GATT Talks, [7 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 668
(May 31, 1989).
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3.5.3. India 6
India was the only country cited under "Super 301" in 1990. On
April 27, 1990, President Bush renamed India as a priority country
under "Super 301" for protecting its insurance industry and keeping
out foreign investment."' The reasons for citing India are that it is a
potentially significant market for the United States and that India's re-
strictions damage its own economy. Yet, India ranks twenty-seventh in
the list of the United States' main markets and its bilateral trade sur-
plus of $850 million in 1989 accounts for less than 1 percent of the
United States' overall trade deficit."8
India was likely listed as a priority country in 1990 more for polit-
ical expediency than for any unfair practices that have a significantly
damaging effect on United States trade.99 The Bush Administration
was reluctant to name any "Super 301" targets in 1990 because of the
overriding importance of completing the Uruguay Round delineating
other trade policies.
United States Trade Representative Hills chose not to retaliate
against India despite a finding that its trade practices toward U.S. in-
surance providers and potential investors were "unreasonable." Hills
instead decided that to retaliate at this point would be inappropriate
because of the current Uruguay Round negotiations over ways to ex-
tend GATT rules to include trade in services and investment. She
stated that she will negotiate to open India's markets through these
trade talks.100
4. How THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF "SUPER 301" VIOLATES
UNITED STATES OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GATT
4.1. Statutory Time Limits Conflict with GATT Dispute Resolution
Procedures
One of the changes made by the 1988 amendment is the statutory
imposition of strict time limits on the investigation process. If the for-
*6 See supra note 71.
o See 55 Fed. Reg. 18,693, 18,695-96 (1990).
98 Trade; Wicked Indians, ECONOMIST, May 5, 1990, at 32.
See id. "[1]t is extremely difficult to estimate how much U.S. exports would
increase if a non-tariff barrier to trade were removed." 55 Fed. Reg. 18,693, 18,696
(1990).
100 See 55 Fed. Reg. 25,766 (1990). See also U.S. Will Not Retaliate Against
India Under Super 301, USTR Hills Announces, [7 Current Reports] Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 893 (June 20, 1990).
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eign practice involves a trade agreement, such as the GATT, the
USTR is limited to a maximum of eighteen monthso'' from the initia-
tion of the investigation to negotiate an agreement with the foreign gov-
ernment to end the practice within three years or to compensate the
United States.'0 2 If such an agreement has not been reached within
eighteen months, then the United States Trade Representative must
take retaliatory action.' 03 This differs from the 1979 version where, af-
ter the conclusion of a GATT dispute resolution procedure, the USTR
had thirty days to recommend what action, if any, the President should
take.104 Action was to be taken only when deemed prudent by the Pres-
ident. Thus, the practice was generally for the USTR to recommend
that the President follow the settlement reached under the GATT. This
procedure posed little threat that the United States would make a uni-
lateral determination and retaliate, but instead reinforced the GATT
dispute resolution procedures. The primary purpose of section 301 was
to provide a mechanism whereby private petitioners could access the
GATT and voice their trade complaints.' 5
The United States is obligated, as a signatory to the GATT, to
resolve trade disputes that fall within the scope of the Agreement
through the mechanisms provided under articles XXII and XXIII.'0 6
"[Tlhe practice in GATT ... is to rely mainly upon the provisions of
GATT itself for legal redress in cases of violation or other dispute."'
0 7
The exclusive use of bilateral consultations in areas explicitly covered
by GATT rules violates the United States' obligations under interna-
101 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(2) (1988).
102 19 U.S.C. § 2420(c) (1988).
'Os 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a) (1988) supra note 54.
The only discretionary power retained by the USTR in the 1988 amendment is
with respect to unreasonable or discriminatory foreign practices. See 19 U.S.C. §
2411(b) (1988).
104 See 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a) (Supp. V 1987).
(1) On the basis of the investigation ... , the Trade Representative shall
recommend to the President what action, if any, he should take .... The
Trade Representative shall make that recommendation not later than-
(C) in the case of a petition involving a trade agreement... , 30
days after the dispute settlement procedure is concluded . .
Id.
The mandate was to "take all appropriate and feasible action" to enforce United
States' rights. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (Supp. V 1987). Section 301 authorized the Presi-
dent to take unilateral action which included the option to bypass the GATT proce-
dures and "suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, or refrain from proclaim-
ing, benefits of trade agreement concessions ... [and] impose duties or other import
restrictions ...." 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (Supp. V 1987).
105 See supra note 59.
1o6 See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
107 LAW OF THE GATT, supra note 12, at 164.
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tional law."' n A strict adherence to the time limits imposed by "Super
301" raises the possibility that the United States will make a unilateral
determination supplanting the GATT dispute settlement proceedings
and disregarding international obligations to resolve trade disputes
multilaterally.""°
If such actions are seen to be GATT-inconsistent further
problems would arise. When the United States argues that
other countries should negotiate in good faith in a multilat-
eral forum in order to avoid unilateral actions, such an argu-
ment will be less credible if we have already demonstrated a
willingness to ignore our GATT obligations.'"
"Super 301" investigations may not always involve a trade agree-
ment."' In this situation the GATT does not have exclusive jurisdic-
tion and the United States is free to negotiate bilaterally and proceed in
any manner it wants." 2 Actual retaliation may, however, still violate
the GATT's MFN obligation." 3 Furthermore, investigation and nego-
108 The statute seems to require that the USTR request formal dispute resolution
proceedings 150 days after the commencement of any investigation under section 301,
including an investigation initiated pursuant to "Super 301," if the dispute involves a
trade agreement. See 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2) (1988). Nevertheless, no such request for
proceedings was ever made. One could interpret this failure to request a formal dispute
resolution proceeding not only as a violation of United States obligations under the
GATT, but also a violation of United States statutory law.
109 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
110 Kastenmeir & Beier, International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise,
Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 299 n.44 (1989).
. For example, the "Super 301" investigation of India's investment restrictions
and barriers to trade in services do not involve GATT provisions. See supra note 71.
11. Under a section 301 investigation not involving a trade agreement, the USTR
has 12 months from the initiation of the investigation in which to make a retaliatory
decision. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(2)(B) (1988).
113 A recent and ongoing dispute between the United States and Brazil illustrates
one of the problems with unilateral retaliation, even where the substantive provisions of
the GATT are not involved. The Pharmaceuticals case originated as a private petition
filed by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association alleging Brazil's failure to pro-
vide sufficient patent protection for U.S. pharmaceutical products. In response to the
petition, President Reagan on October 20, 1988 imposed 100 percent tariffs, a total of
$37 million in sanctions, on Brazilian imports into the United States. See United States
Isolated as it Resists Call for Probe of Tariffs on Brazilian Goods, [5 Current Re-
ports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1415 (Oct. 26, 1988).
GATT refers in only a limited manner to intellectual property rights. See LAW OF
THE GATT, supra note 12; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS
OR CONFLICT? 2 (R.M. Gadbaw & T. Richards eds. 1988). Thus, the United States is
under no obligation to resort to the GATT dispute resolution procedures. However, the
remedy chosen by President Reagan, punitive import duties, nonetheless violated MFN
obligations under the GATT. Brazil's request that a GATT panel be formed to decide
whether the punitive import duties levied on Brazilian pharmaceuticals were legal
under GATT was blocked by the United States. See United States Isolated as it Resists
Call for Probe of Tariffs on Brazilian Goods, [6 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep.
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tiation of a non-GATT trade practice on a bilateral basis may not be a
prudent policy for long-term goals of free trade:
[S]ection 301 has caused frequent bilateral resolutions of
trade disputes outside of the GATT framework. This pro-
cess has created short-term solutions to many trade
problems, frequently at the expense of long-term possibilities
for more open trade, and to the detriment of GATT as an
organ for international trade dispute resolution.
1 14
4.2. "Super 301" Reduces Discretion
"Super 301," unlike previous versions of section 301, does not rec-
ognize the need to take account of the current international legal frame-
work."' Rather, it establishes a procedural framework that puts the
Executive under constant pressure from Congress to act aggressively.
The President is no longer granted broad discretion when deciding "ap-
propriate and feasible"11 6 action. Political considerations are a vital
component in trade negotiations. "[T]he United States must recognize
that foreign practices and policies reflect delicate political balances that
a foreign government may be unable or unwilling to disturb."'1 These
complex foreign policy considerations are difficult, if not impossible, to
balance through statutory requirements. The need to "balance the goal
of obtaining relief for a particular group or industry against other goals
such as maintaining positive relations with a given country" ' makes
discretion an important ingredient in trade policy. "Super 301" elimi-
nates much of the earlier flexibility in initiating investigations of for-
eign governments' trade practices and imposes rigid procedures that
sharply contrast the "all appropriate and feasible action" language in
previous versions of section 301.
(BNA) No. 1, at 23 (Jan. 4, 1989). Only after being pressured at the GATT meeting
on February 21, 1989 did the United States accept the establishment of an investigatory
panel. See U.S. Accepts Creation of GATT Panel to Study Sanctions on Brazilian
Pharmaceutical Goods, [6 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 238
(Feb. 22, 1989).
114 Section 301 Against Japanese Gov't, supra note 23, at 516 n.192 (1987).
115 "Trade legislation generally involves wide executive discretion because of the
nature of international economic affairs and constitutional separation of powers con-
cerns." Opening Up Trade Barriers, supra note 35, at 191. See, e.g., United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (where the Supreme Court has upheld the President's
exclusive power in international relations).
11 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
117 Comment, Defining Unreasonableness in Int'l Trade: Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L.J. 1122, 1128 (1987).
118 Id. at 1131.
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The problems associated with the restriction of discretion by
"Super 301" are particularly acute with respect to a developing nation,
such as Brazil. Brazil is trying to meet its debt payments. Unless other
countries are willing to cooperate, Brazil "has no choice but to control
imports, which while hurting the country's development perspective,
will at least help the balance of payments situation in the short run." '
The USTR should be granted flexibility in order to weigh the impor-
tance to the nation of reducing foreign barriers to United States imports
with the desirability of Brazil's continuing ability to raise funds to pay
its foreign debt.
Some discretion is maintained by the USTR 20 For example, the
USTR is not required to act if there is a GATT determination that the
rights of the United States are not being "nullified or impaired." 2
Yet, in many instances, the policy of the United States is to avoid these
dispute settlement proceedings. By restricting the consultation period to
a maximum of eighteen months, the United States precludes any deci-
sion by a GATT panel from being rendered.' 22 It is now much more
difficult to justify "unfair trade policies based on diplomatic or security
concerns. Public identification of trade barriers abroad inevitably raises
the visibility of trade issues."1 23 The clear intent of Congress was to
urge the Executive to impose sanctions unilaterally on foreign nations'
products if unfair trade practices are not eliminated. A protectionist-
minded administration now has the tools to "get tough" with trading
partners and presidents will find it more difficult to resist using these
tools, particularly in a recession.
'19 U.S. Comes Under Attack Over Trade Policy at GATT Council Meeting, [6
Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 830 (June 28, 1989).
12. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2) (1988) states:
The Trade Representative is not required to take action under paragraph
(1) in any case in which-
(A) the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade have determined, a panel of experts has reported to the Contracting
Parties, or a ruling issued under the formal dispute settlement proceeding
provided under any other trade agreement finds, that-
(i) the rights of the United States ... are not being denied ....
Id.
121 The USTR is also not required to act if the foreign government agrees to end
the practice or agrees to compensate the United States. In addition, if retaliation
"would have an adverse impact on the United States economy substantially out of pro-
portion to the benefits of such action," 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(iv), or "would cause
serious harm to the national security of the United States," 19 U.S.C. §
2411(a)(2)(B)(v), then it is not required.
122 See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
12 TRADE WARRIORS, supra note 73, at 28.
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4.3. Unilateral Retaliation Violates Most-Favored-Nation Obliga-
tions Under the GATT
The disturbing trend is to apply section 301 retaliation measures
independently of GATT obligations. The original section 252(c) con-
tained a requirement that the President "[h]ave due regard for the in-
ternational obligations of the United States." '124 Congress deleted this
requirement in the Trade Act of 1974 because, "the President ought to
be able to act or threaten to act under section 301 whether or not such
action would be entirely consistent with [international obligations].'
12 5
The 1988 amendment further circumvents the GATT by requiring, not
merely permitting as under earlier versions, retaliation when the rights
of the United States are unilaterally determined to be impaired.
The USTR has stated that retaliation is not the intended result of
the "Super 301" investigations. Instead, "Super 301" is to provide the
United States with leverage in settlement negotiations with the priority
country.1 26 However, if consultations to eliminate the unfair trade prac-
tice are unsuccessful and no settlement is reached in the mandated time
period, the USTR's discretion has been reduced in deciding whether to
take action. The words of the statute and the legislative history indicate
that the USTR is to take some action within the Representative's
authority.
1 7
124 Trade Expansion Act, supra note 41. See also Opening Up Trade Barriers,
supra note 35 (summary of the changes the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 made to
301).
S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 166 (1974).
126 USTR Hills, stated that "[nione of us... wants to retaliate. If we are success-
ful in our negotiations we will not have to retaliate .... [The Super 301 provision] is
the leverage to have more successful negotiations .... USTR Hills Says Trade Deficit
Will Stay Until Nation Tackles Inability to Save, [6 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 19, at 575 (May 10, 1989) (responding to remark by Dr. Michael Boskin,
Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, that if the United States
retaliates against its trade partners it will cause a worldwide recession).
127 The scope of the USTR's authority is delineated in 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1). It
authorizes the Trade Representative to:
(A) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of trade
agreement concessions ... ;
(B) impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of ... such
foreign country ... ; or
(C) enter into binding agreements with such foreign country that commit
such foreign country to-
(i) eliminate ... the act, policy, or practice ....
(ii) eliminate any burden or restriction on United States commerce.
. . ,or
(iii) provide the United States with compensatory trade benefits....
19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1) (1988).
In addition, the USTR may restrict or deny access authorization to any services
sector. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(2)(A) (1988).
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At this point no retaliatory measures have been taken against for-
eign countries under "Super 301" investigation. The investigations
against Japan and Brazil have been satisfactorily resolved. However,
discriminatory unilateral action, such as that threatened if settlement is
not reached, clearly violates GATT MFN obligations.128 It is distres-
sing that Congress' apparent intent is to urge the Executive to violate
the unconditional MFN on which GATT is based.
5. "SUPER 301" APPLICATION AS A UNILATERAL MEASURE BY
THE UNITED STATES IS A THREAT TO THE MULTILATERAL TRADE -
SYSTEM AND SHOULD NOT BE REAUTHORIZED
Justification for measures such as "Super 301" is based on the
United States trade deficit problem and declining U.S. world competi-
tiveness. Yet, by ignoring the chronic budget deficit, Congress ignores
the main source of the country's trade deficit.' 29 Economists say the
"trade deficit stems primarily from the proclivity of the United States
government to spend rather than to save. The most important element
of the savings gap is the federal budget deficit ... .""' Prompted by
pressure from protectionist-minded United States companies,' 31 mem-
bers of Congress are increasingly looking outside the borders for a
scapegoat for domestic economic woes.' 32
The importance of exports in the United States economy is grow-
ing. "Net exports have been responsible for 90% of the economy's
growth this year. A recent estimate ... suggested that a successful con-
128 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
129
[T]he worst aspect of Super 301 is focus; it will divert attention from the
profound domestic sources of America's manufacturing crisis. Put aside for
a moment any notions of how open or closed the Japanese market is.
When American manufacturers cannot compete or don't exist at home, the
root problem is not foreign but domestic. Solving this problem will be a
formidable challenge, requiring nothing less than an American brand of
perestroika in both foreign and domestic policy.
Holland, Bashing, Bullying, Blaming Japan, U.S. Deals with a Deficit, L.A. Times,
May 7, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
1"0 Weil, "Super 301" Will Do Little to Trim Trade Gap, Economists Say, Reu-
ter Bus. Rep., June 9, 1989.
131 See Trade Warriors, supra note 73, at 4. See also Recent Developments, 31
HARV. INT'L L.J. 359, 365 (1990).
12 Protectionism in general is something that business has promoted. Milton
Friedman terms this "the suicidal impulse" of the United States business community
that seeks government solutions, such as tariffs. "It's tragic that the business community
... should over and over again be following policies which if carried out would end up
destroying the very basis of its existence." United States Should Resist Pressures for
Managed Trade Policy, Analysts Say, [6 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 39, at 1273, 1274 (Oct. 4, 1989).
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clusion of the Uruguay Round could add up to 5% ($300 billion) a
year to America's GNP by the end of the century."' 33 Given the grow-
ing signifigance of foreign trade to the United States economy, the suc-
cessful completion of the Uruguay Round and the continued viability of
the multilateral trade system is of great consequence to the United
States. "The power of the multilateral process enshrined in the GATT
has been the ability to maximize the gains and minimize the adjustment
costs from mutual reductions in trade barriers - usually resulting in
larger gains than were expected."" 4 The threatened retaliation under
"Super 301" may provide the USTR with leverage, enabling her to
eliminate some of the trade barriers. However, a continuing disregard
for the United States' obligation to resolve problems through the dis-
pute resolution procedures may defeat the possibility for long-term im-
provements in the GATT framework.
The 1989 "Super 301" listings of Brazil, Japan and India as pri-
ority countries have raised the fear that the international trade system
under the GATT is in jeopardy because of the United States' increas-
ing unilateralism. 3 5 It "has aroused a great deal of anxiety on the part
of U.S. trading partners" and "has left some with doubts about U.S.
allegiance to the multilateral system." ' The true danger from the
'1 The same study calculated a Uruguay Round failure that led to increased
trade restrictions could cut GNP by $100 billion. Dancing from Bad to Worse, ECONO-
MIST, Nov. 17, 1990, at 25.
I"' Kim & Wheeler, At All Costs, Save GATT, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 5,
1990, at 18 [hereinafter At All Costs]. "[O]ver time, negotiations have become increas-
ingly painful. The easy gains possible through tariff liberalizations have been achieved.
Now significant gains depend upon negotiating mutual modifications in member na-
tions' domestic policies, leading to domestic political conflict as a result." Id.
131 "Super 301" has generated tension among the contracting parties as illustrated
by the open criticism of United States' trade policy in the GATT Council meeting in
Geneva on June 21, 1989. The meeting was filled with attacks on "Super 301." The
United States had no support during the first morning of debates with other member
nations' delegates saying, "that if the United States persists in using Section 301 of the
Trade Act and its derivatives as a bilateral method of retaliation against other coun-
tries, it could sound the death knell for the ongoing Uruguay Round of GATT trade
negotiations." U.S. Comes Under Attack Over Trade Policy at GATT Council Meeting,
Defends Super 301, [6 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 830 (June
28, 1989).
GATT Director General Arthur Dunkel expressed his view that unilateral trade
laws, such as the United States' section 301, is the antithesis of the Uruguay Round's
goal of increased trade liberalization. He stated that, "[tihe successful conclusion of the
Uruguay Round is a must if we don't want to see trade and economic relations fall into
the tragedy of bilateralism and unilateralism." GATT's Dunkel Criticizes U.S. Section
301, Urges Strong Commitment to Uruguay Round, [7 Current Reports] Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 766 (May 30, 1990).
156 U.S. Commitment to Uruguay Round Perceived as Inconsistent with Policies,
Report Finds, [7 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 1646 (Jan. 3,
1990).
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United States' pro-export policies like "Super 301" is the perception
that the "U.S. wants the best of all worlds - benefiting from multilat-
eral agreements as well as from its own bilateral muscle." 7 Threaten-
ing "priority countries" with retaliation can seriously damage the mul-
tilateral system under the GATT by prompting bilateral squabbling
and reciprocal action. Even the threat of retaliation alone can impede
multilateral negotiations such as the Uruguay Round.13
United States Trade Representative Hills has emphasized that the
current Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations are at the top
of her agenda. 39 However, a recent review of the United States' trade
policies 40 questioned the consistency between the United States' inter-
est in improving GATT's rules under the Uruguay Round' 4' and its
bilateral and unilateral objectives outside the GATT framework. 2
'37 Super 301, with All Fairness, Pleases and Displeases Evenly, METALS WK.,
July 24, 1989, at 3.
'1 Confidence in the United States among the other ninety-eight contracting par-
ties is on the wane and the quality of talks degenerated with the designation of Japan,
Brazil and India as "Super 301" countries in June of 1989. See Structural Barriers
Not Good Candidates for Super 301 Action, USTR Hills Asserts, [6 Current Reports]
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1067, 1068 (Aug. 16, 1989).
Hills acknowledged that the Super 301 process had offended some foreign
governments to the point where bilateral progress has been impeded since
then, saying, "[tihe bad news is that after the designation, the quality of
talks has not been the same." Although significant progress in negotiations
with several countries - most notably Korea - just prior to the May
deadline kept them from being named to the Super 301 list, Hills said
"that high plateau of progress just fell off a cliff" after Japan, Brazil, and
India were named. "As we come into the fall, we're getting it back, but it's
hard to start talks when you're starting with a lecture [from foreign
governments]."
Id.
139 USTR Hills stated in the report to Congress of trade liberalization priorities
that the highest priority is successful negotiations at the Uruguay Round. "[T]he high-
est trade liberalization priority identified by the USTR is to conclude successfully the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations." 54 Fed. Reg. 24,438 (1989).
140 In December 1988 the GATT Council agreed to review the trade policies of
members to ensure compliance with GATT codes. The policies of developed nations
will be reviewed every two years, the policies of sixteen newly industrialized nations
every four years, and the policies of developing countries every six years. See GATT
Officials Decide to Postpone Conclusions of Uruguay Round Midterm Review Until
April, [5 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1617, 1619 (Dec. 14,
1988).
141 See supra note 37 for U.S. criticism of GATT dispute resolution procedures.
142 See U.S. Commitment to Uruguay Round Perceived as Inconsistent with Poli-
cies, Report Finds, [6 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 1646 (Dec.
20, 1989) for a discussion of the review of the United States' trade policies released on
December 14, 1989 to the GATT Council in Geneva.
[T]he enactment of the 1988 Trade Act with language to strengthen Sec-
tion 301 of the 1974 Trade Act and the so-called "Super 301" provision
"has aroused a great deal of anxiety on the part of U.S. trading partners."
Recent uses of the retaliatory feature available to the United States under
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The GATT secretariat characterized this perceived discrepancy as a
"major concern for all the United States' trading partners."14
Many U.S. trading partners, especially the European Community
("EC"), are pressing hard for the elimination of section 301 as part of
the talks." The EC Commission approved a proposal 4" on March 12,
1990 to strengthen the GATT's dispute settlement procedures within
the Uruguay Round. A pre-condition for any negotiation on this issue
is, however, the conformity of all national legislation with GATT prin-
ciples and rules, in particular the renouncing of all unilateral mea-
sures.14 Unilateral measures are described as "incompatible with the
multilateral approach to dispute settlement,' 147 and although not spe-
cifically mentioned, "Super 301" is its prime objective.
A multilateral process is far superior to bilateral actions as a
basis for trade negotiation and dispute resolution. It mini-
mizes competitive distortions among countries, making it eas-
ier for all to reduce barriers. It keeps pressure on all coun-
tries to abide by the same rules. By use of third party
dispute resolution and common, i.e. multilateral, agreement
Section 301, as in a dispute with the European Community over the use of
hormones in beef and a conflict with Brazil over its alleged failure to
honor U.S. pharmaceutical patents, have been interpreted by other GATT
members as "a lack of commitment on the part of the United States to
multilateral rules and procedures."
Id. (quoting the GATT secretariat).
"" The European Community Ambassador Tran Van Tinh said, "[w]e cannot
see GATT sink because of an error of U.S. judgment -- the U.S. is swimming against
the tide of international trade policy." U.S. Comes Under Attack Over Trade Policy at
GATT Council Meeting, Defends Super 301, [6 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 28, at 830 (June 28, 1989).
144 Richard C. Wright, first secretary for commercial affairs at the EC's office in
Washington, wondered "how the countries participating in the Uruguay Round could
be expected to accept new commitments 'when they can't be sure existing rules [prohib-
iting unilateral action] will be enforced.'"
EC Seeks "Major Reform" of U.S. Law in GATT Trade Talks, EC Official Says, [7
Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 131 (Jan. 24, 1990).
145 The EC Commission's proposal "suggests changing the composition of GATT
panels from diplomats to a relatively restricted list of trade specialists who 'have no link
with national administrators,' but who do have sufficient legal, economic, and trade
experience." See European Community Adopts Uruguay Round Proposal to
Strengthen Dispute Settlement, [7 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at
374 (Mar. 14, 1990).
146 EC Trade Commissioner, Frans Andriessen, states that it is "impossible for
the EC to agree to a reinforcement of a multilateral dispute settlement procedure
within the Uruguay Round if all contracting parties do not reject the potential for
unilateral action." EC Says Successful Uruguay Round Impossible if U.S. Relies on
Unilateral Super 301 Action, [7 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at
962 (June 27, 1990).
147 Id.
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on the rules of the game, trade problems can be dealt with
less confrontationally. Moreover, a multilateral approach
tends to reduce the us versus them, "zero-sum," mentality
that so dominates trade discussions in any event.' 48
Every country engages in some form of discriminatory practice, but the
proper forum for the settling of disputes over trade practices is the
GATT. In sum, the dispute resolution procedures are to provide a
means for "ensuring continued reciprocity and balance of concessions in
the face of possibly changing circumstances," 149 and resort to other
means, such as section 301's bilateral negotiations under the threat of
unilateral retaliation, may jeopardize the multilateral cooperation nec-
essary to ensure the continued viability of the GATT.
6. CONCLUSION
"Super 301" requires the USTR to initiate and conduct investiga-
tions without resorting to the GATT mechanisms for trade dispute res-
olution. There is a strong argument for the proposition that the GATT
has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving its provisions. Investi-
gations of trade practices which the United States alleges are violative
of the GATT should therefore be pursued through articles XXII and
XXIII, rather than bilaterally through "Super 301."
The argument that the United States does not have jurisdiction is
less persuasive if the "Super 301" investigation involves an unfair trade
practice that falls outside of the scope of the GATT, such as intellec-
tual property, services, or investment disagreements. However, in such
cases, the GATT does not preclude the United States from requesting
formal dispute proceedings under article XXIII. Due to the possibility
that a unilateral determination imposing sanctions on a contracting
party may violate the United States' unconditional MFN obligations,
the GATT may be a better forum for United States complaints. Most
significantly, even without actual retaliation, "Super 301's" threat has
generated much criticism from other GATT members with the poten-
tial that free trade objectives may be retarded rather than accelerated.
One of the mitigating factors in the clash between section 301 uni-
lateralism and GATT principles "has been the historic caution and
prudence of presidents in investigating section 301 claims and their at-
tention to principles of international law when they have decided to
148 At All Costs, supra note 134, at 18.
149 LAW OF ThE GATT, supra note 12, at 170 (footnote omitted).
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take more aggressive action."'1 50 The mandatory self-initiation and
mandatory retaliation requirements of "Super 301" take away from the
Executive much of this flexibility and discretionary power, conflict
more directly with the GATT, and pose a greater danger of obstructing
progress in multinational trade negotiations.
The reduction of the trade deficit is an important priority for
United States' trade policy. However, "Super 301" is not the best
method to achieve that end. Congress, unable to reach a politically ac-
ceptable remedy for fiscal deficits, "remains obsessed with questions of
trade and foreign investment, both symptoms of domestic economic mis-
management and political stalemate."' 15 It is essential that the effects of
the United States' unilateral actions under "Super 301" are not ig-
nored, and that the trend toward unilateralism and disregard for the
dispute resolution procedures under GATT ceases.
150 Section 301 Against Japanese Government, supra note 23, at 517 (footnote
omitted).
151 TRADE WARRIORS, supra note 73, at 2.
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